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I. INTRODUCTION
In an appreciation of Harold Jacobson written for the American
Journal of International Law, I concluded that following the events of
September 11, 2001, we would need the kind of gentle wisdom Harold
Jacobson brought to his tasks more than ever.' I also recalled Harold Ja-
cobson's own observation in Networks of Interdependence that his
assessment of the global political system was an optimistic, but not a
nalve one. These qualities of quiet determination to get to the bottom of
an issue and of optimism stemmed from a fundamental belief that indi-
viduals, armed with information and the opportunity for debate, could
make important decisions wisely. This was at the heart of his interest in
politics and sustained his deep commitment to working carefully through
information to provide the fullest possible understanding of a problem.
The last major project Harold Jacobson worked on was one that he con-
ceived and directed with me to understand how accountability could be
maintained when decisions to use military forces are made by interna-
tional institutions not directly accountable, as are national governments,
to citizens in democratic societies.
Our conclusions have been published in Democratic Accountability
and the Use of Force in International Law, a comparative study of nine
* Executive Vice President and Executive Director of The American Society of Inter-
national Law since 1994, Dr. Ku received her PhD, M.A.L.D., and M.A. from The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and B.A. from American University. Dr. Ku
is a Past Chair of the Academic Council on the United Nations System and a former member
of the faculty of the University of Virginia.
1. Charlotte Ku, Harold K. Jacobson (1929-2001): An Appreciation, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 849 (2001).
2. HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (2nd ed. 1984).
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countries.3 We found that the post-World War II international security
system as provided for in the United Nations Charter has adapted to a
variety of new tasks, but that it remains incomplete. We discovered that
the UN Charter system as a means to restrain the use of force has per-
haps developed more fully than the Charter system's ability to authorize
and to enable states to use force in situations other than a clear cross
border invasion of a member state. At the same time, we recognized that
the existence of an international institution like the United Nations has
fundamentally changed the character of international politics in two
ways. First, the fact that international institutions are based on assump-
tions of sovereign equality affects the relative power of states, thereby
providing all states (whether small or large) both a voice and a part in the
decision-making process. Second, after a half century, international insti-
tutions have emerged as new forms of political authority.
Issues of accountability are most pertinent when the decisions of
such political authorities affect the lives and well-being of citizens.
Through most of the UN's history, scholars have focused on the ac-
countability of the decisions made by international institutions that
obligate a member state to contribute resources and soldiers to opera-
tions that may not be clearly seen by its own citizens as in a country's
national interest. However, since the end of the Cold War, we have been
increasingly struggling with the question of what needs to be done when
action may appear necessary, particularly to key UN member states, but
may not be permitted under the Charter because of the inability to secure
the authorization of a UN Security Council resolution and/or because
there is no clear case for the exercise of self-defense. The international
system struggled with these issues in attempting to respond to the hu-
manitarian emergencies in Rwanda and Kosovo in the 1990s and
continues to grapple with them, as demonstrated by the UN Security
Council disarray over actions taken by the United States and the United
Kingdom that led to war with Iraq in 2003.
On February 14, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the
UN Security Council: "Force should always be a last resort ... but it
must be a resort.' 4 In March 2003, the members of the UN Security
Council remained unconvinced that the time to use force to disarm Iraq
had arrived, and refused to give the U.S.-led coalition authorization to do
so. Those who opposed the U.S. view that the time had come to disarm
Iraq through the use of military force argued that UN inspections were
3. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2003) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY].
4. Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, (Feb. 14, 2003)
(available at http://www.state.gov.secretary/rm/2003/17763.htm).
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working to reveal Iraq's weapons and to destroy them as appropriate.
The U.S., however, argued for more decisive action in the face of a
changed security environment. In June 2002, President George W. Bush
described this new environment to the 200 'h graduating class of the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point: "The gravest danger to freedom lies at
the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemi-
cal and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile
technology-when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could
attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations."5
On March 9, 2003, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice, noted that over the last decade, the UN Security Council had failed
to act in such situations as Rwanda (1992) and Kosovo (1999) where
numerous lives were lost.6 In Kosovo, of course, the U.S. eventually
acted with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to
end the displacement and slaughter of the Albanian population by the
government of Serbia. This operation profoundly shook NATO and the
countries that took part in the Kosovo operation and set the stage for the
debate that took place over action in Iraq.
Which side of the argument is right? Is it the side that argues the re-
sponsibility of power to act, if necessary unilaterally, to protect those
who are being victimized? Or is it the side that argues that, however
compelling the case, states today cannot act on the basis of their own
conclusions and judgment without direct provocation or international
authorization? And if the United States acts without Security Council
authorization, does that spell the end of the nearly sixty-year-old UN
security system? Are we reverting to the unregulated use of force as an
instrument of state policy in existence prior to the advent of the League
of Nations and the United Nations? We do not yet know, but each step
taken outside of the UN framework, particularly by the most powerful
member of the United Nations, raises a question about the ongoing rele-
vance of that framework. How the question is answered, though, may be
more significant in determining the UN's future than what the answer is.
A. The Evolving International Security Framework
More than eighty years ago, when Woodrow Wilson asked Congress
for a declaration of war against Germany on April 2, 1917, he said:
"A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a
partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be
5. George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point (June 1, 2002), quoted in THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13 (2002).
6. This Week (ABC News television broadcast, Mar. 9, 2003).
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trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a
league of honor, a partnership of opinion. ' 7 He then intoned that: "The
world must be made safe for democracy."8 As one of the war aims, Wil-
son provided a specific proposal for the shape of this concert of peace in
his Fourteen Points Speech in January 1918. Point XIV provided that: "A
general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants
for the purposes of affording mutual guarantees of political independ-
ence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." 9
Though nearly a century has passed since those words were spoken,
the U.S. appears to be facing the same set of tensions between creating a
secure and stable international system and agreeing on the appropriate
international mechanism for doing so. In Wilson's day, the objection to
the League of Nations was tied to Article 10 of the League of Nations
Covenant that called on League members "to respect and preserve as
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League."' The objection was that
this obligation would tie the U.S. to commitments that would not be in
its national interest, and that appropriate national authorities like Con-
gress would not be consulted prior to acting as a result of a decision
from such an international institution."
What is often overlooked is that the concern about acting in a coun-
try's national interest is not a problem for the U.S. alone, but is one
shared by all members of the UN, particularly when the international
decision requires a country to take part in operations that entail deadly
force. The deadlier the potential use of force, the more domestic debate
and decision-making is required.' 2 In this respect, it is important to recall
that the UN security system addresses both form and substance. Indeed,
the UN Charter does not prohibit the use of force, but it does seek to
regulate its use and makes clear that the primary organ for this regulation
is the United Nations Security Council. But the question of acting with-
out Security Council authorization has existed since the founding of the
United Nations, as has the question of declining to act, despite UN Secu-
rity Council authorization. Alternatives to Security Council authorization
7. Woodrow Wilson, War Message (April 2, 1917), at http://www.usembassy.de/
speeches/rhetoric/wwwar.htm.
8. Id.
9. Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech (January 8, 1918), at http://isinfo.state.
gov/usa/infousa/democrac/5 I.htm.
10. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.
II. See 59 CONG. REC. 5, 4599 (1920) (U.S. Senate reservations to the Covenant of the
League of Nations); Leo Gross, The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reserva-
tions, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 531-54 (1947).
12. See generally DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3 (describing the prac-
tices of nine countries).
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have been sought almost from the beginning of the United Nations. Ini-
tially stymied by the Cold War and the threat of vetoes by the Soviet
Union, the United States, supported by its close ally, the United King-
dom, promoted the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950, enabling the
UN General Assembly to act if the Security Council was unable to re-
spond to a threat to the peace.'3 British support for use of the Uniting for
Peace resolution waned after the resolution was used against the U.K.
following the British-French takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956.
At a time when the U.S. commanded easy majorities in the General
Assembly, the Uniting for Peace resolution seemed a reasonable alterna-
tive to gain international authorization if the Security Council failed to
act. However, as the U.S. lost its ability to command an automatic major-
ity in the General Assembly starting in 1964, this was no longer seen as
a viable alternative.' 4 It may also be worth noting that the Uniting for
Peace Resolution continued to recognize the Security Council's central
role in the UN security system, stating that only
[If] the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security in any case where
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the mat-
ter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including
in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use
of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.'5
Through the decades of its existence, the UN Security Council has
become the preferred international authority for the use of force. Even
when the Security Council did not initially authorize a military opera-
tion, states clearly think it important to seek such authorization post hoc,
as occurred with the operations that took place under the leadership of
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia
(1992) and of NATO in Kosovo (1999). In this respect, there seems little
question that Harold Jacobson's view that international institutions have
13. See Eric Stein & Richard C. Morrissey, Uniting for Peace Resolution, in 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L L. 1232, 1233-34 (2000).
14. Harold K. Jacobson & Andrea M. Lopez, Changes in the UN General Assembly,
(1999) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
15. G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
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taken on a political authority and an importance of their own separate
from that of their member states is accurate.1
6
In its design, the United Nations Charter went farther than the
League of Nations Covenant in establishing a system of collective secu-
rity. The Charter was designed to correct perceived weaknesses of the
League system and did so in two ways. First, it concentrated in the Secu-
rity Council decision-making on action to counter threats to the peace
under Article 39 of the Charter. Second, it provided for means to carry
out the Council's decisions under Article 43. Article 43 called on UN
members to "make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assis-
tance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security."' 7 However, al-
most from the outset, the Charter's vision of how military force would be
used by the UN was substantially modified. Article 43 agreements were
never completed, and the Security Council has never had military forces
at its call. The result has been that member states decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to contribute their military forces to particular opera-
tions, what forces to contribute, under what conditions, and for what
purpose.18
Despite these shortcomings in the UN security system, military
forces have been used 79 times for a broad range of purposes under UN
authorization from 1946 to 2002. Military forces were used once under a
NATO mandate in the former Yugoslavia.' 9 In addition to thwarting cross
border aggression in Korea and Kuwait, the case for which the doctrine
of collective security and the UN security system were designed, these
UN operations were based on several purposes that were not envisaged
when the League Covenant and UN Charter were signed. Among these
were maintaining cease-fire agreements, preventing genocide and serious
violations of human rights, and restoring a democratically elected gov-
ernment. A further unanticipated development was that, of the 27
operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, 21 or
78% were intra-state conflicts .
16. See Harold K. Jacobson, International Institutions and System Transformation, 3
ANN. REV. POL. Sc. 149, 163 (2000), available at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/cgi/
reprint/3/l/149.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
18. Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Au-
thorizations to Use Force, Cease-fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124
(1999).
19. See DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, app. A, at 384-95.
20. See Jochen Abr. Frowein, United Nations, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L L.,
at 1039, (2000).
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In 55 of the 79 cases (70%), military forces were under UN com-
mand.2 ' The force commander was appointed by and reported to the
Secretary-General. In one case, Operation Allied Force, NATO used its
own command structure. In the other 23 cases, the UN authorized indi-
vidual states or coalitions of states to use military forces to achieve goals
specified in resolutions adopted by the Security Council.23 In these cases,
the state or states conducting the operation used their own command
structures. The authorizing resolutions requested that they keep the Se-
curity Council informed. Where such a delegation or sub-contracting
takes place, states have interpreted the broad authorization language of
Security Council resolutions to permit a wide range of conduct.24 A
prominent example of where such delegations have been used, particu-
larly where deadly force has been required, is in the enforcement of the
no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq following the first Gulf War
through UN Security Council resolution 688. Such delegations are
among the most controversial UN actions and are subject to little over-
sight by the Security Council.25
Of the 79 cases, military forces were used 20 times under the aus-
pices of the UN from 1946-1989, and 59 times from 1 January 1990
through 2002.26 The end of the Cold War brought a dramatic increase in
UN involvement in conflicts because of a renewed interest in using in-
ternational institutions by powerful member states that were previously
reluctant or unable to do so. Appendix A lists the cases in which military
forces were used under UN and NATO auspices. It gives the name and
acronym for the operation, the operation's location, the resolution pro-
viding the initial authorization, whether or not the resolution referred to
Chapter VII as a basis for its authority, and the command arrangements.
Table I below places the 79 cases into five broad categories. These
categories are based on: the mandate of the operation, the rules of en-
gagement given to the military forces, whether or not they enter the
21. See U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., U.N. PEACEKEEPING: 50 YEARS 1948-1998 (1998)
[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS].
22. See DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, app. A, at 384-95.
23. See DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII
POWERS (1999).
24. For a brief legal analysis of this position, see Frederic L. Kirgis, The Legal Back-
ground on the Use of Force to Induce Iraq to Comply with Security Council Resolutions, ASIL
INSIGHTS (Nov. 1997), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl2.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2003).
25. See SAROOSHI, supra note 23.
26. Updated information as provided in Table A.I in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY,
supra note 3, at 384-95.
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territory of the state where they operate with the consent of that state,
and the number and types of military personnel involved.27
Monitoring and observation involves the positioning of troops, mili-
tary observers, and related personnel on one or both sides of a line
between entities that are or have been engaged in, or where there is a
threat of, armed conflict, with the primary objective of preventing (re-
newed) hostilities. The observers are stationed with the consent of the
host country and are impartial. They carry no arms.
Traditional Peacekeeping involves unarmed or lightly armed military
contingents in the monitoring, supervision, and verification of cease-fire,
withdrawal, buffer zone, and related agreements, with the consent of the
parties. It requires consent of the host country and impartiality; the use
of military force, other than in personal or small unit self-defense, is in-
compatible with the concept.
Peacekeeping plus State-building supplements traditional peacekeep-
ing with activities such as election monitoring or organization, human
rights protection, and civil administration functions or assistance during
transition to independence or democracy.
Force to Ensure Compliance with International Mandates involves
the use of force to ensure the safety of peacekeepers, enable them to
carry out a mandate that is being frustrated, and protect international
legal principles. Military forces engaged in such operations usually also
perform state-building tasks.
Enforcement involves the use of military forces to maintain or re-
store peace in a conflict or major security crisis. The classic enforcement
operation responds to an attack on the territorial integrity of a state. By
definition, enforcement does not require the consent of the state deemed
to be a threat to the peace.
Table 1 shows that the general character of military operations
carried out under international auspices changed substantially after the
Cold War. More operations prior to the end of the Cold War were con-
sent-based and involved less war-like operations, such as monitoring and
observation functions and consent-based peacekeeping. This changed
with the end of the Cold War. More operations received mandates to un-
27. This categorization draws heavily on the concepts developed in GARETH EVANS,
COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND (1993). It is
related to but different from the categorization developed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. See
BoUTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992). More broadly, it draws on the
wide literature concerning peacekeeping, including: PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACE-
KEEPING (1993); UN PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE
1990s (William J. Durch ed., 1996); A CRISIS IN EXPECTATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE
1990s (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995); and, JAMES S. SUTTERLIN, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A CHALLENGE TO
BE MET (1995).
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dertake intrusive and non-consent-based activities, to force compliance
with existing mandates, to provide conditions for state-building, and to
repel aggression. The more complicated an operation is, the higher the
cost and risk to those undertaking it. The higher the risk, the more con-
tributing states will need to justify the risk to their soldiers as fulfilling a
national interest. There will be greater demands for public accountabil-
ity.
TABLE I
USES OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER THE AUSPICES
OF THE UN AND NATO"
Forms of Use Period
of Military Forces
1946-1989 1990-2002
Monitoring and 9 (45%) 9 (15.2%)
Observation
Traditional Peacekeeping 5 (25%) 2 (3.4%)
Peacekeeping plus State- 3(15%) 25 (41%)
Building
Force to Ensure 2 (10%) 22 (39%)
Compliance
Enforcement 1(5%) 1(1.6%)
Total 20 (100%) 59 (100%)
As Table 1 shows, military forces were used under UN and NATO
auspices much more frequently in the decade starting in 1990 than in the
preceding four decades. Prior to 1990, the use of force was either unilat-
eral or within the regional frameworks of the Organization of American
States or the Warsaw Pact. From 1946-89, with the exception of the
Middle East, where its role emerged out of that of the League of Nations
in the Palestine mandate, the UN was only called on to undertake actions
in places where neither the USSR nor the U.S. could hope to do more
than contain each other's influence. UN-commanded operations were
deployed 17 times from 1945-89, and 38 times from 1990-2002. The
remaining 24 operations took place under national or regional organiza-
tions' command.
28. See DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3.
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Table I also shows clearly that the nature of UN missions using mili-
tary forces was quite different in the two periods. Monitoring and
observation missions constituted 45% of deployments in the first period,
and only 15.2% in the second. In sharp contrast to the Cold War period,
when missions in the first four categories were deployed only with the
consent of the host state, many operations in the 1990s occurred without
the consent of the host state, were more intrusive in its affairs, and were
involved in intrastate conflicts. What these numbers demonstrate is that
when great powers have consensus about operations, as seemed the case
immediately following the Cold War, the UN can act more forcefully.
But when such consensus is not present, as was the case in the period
1946-1989, the UN may be avoided in situations where maximum force
is used.
Time will tell us whether the failure in 2003 to reach a consensus on
action in Iraq among the permanent members of the Security Council
marks the start of another phase in the operation of the UN security sys-
tem. This new phase may signal a return to the UN's early history during
the Cold War, when states pursued their interests outside of the UN sys-
tem if there was a chance that such action would be blocked through it.
In this context, it may be useful to recall that, where members of the Se-
curity Council could reach consensus, as was the case with the Palestine
question, the Cold War was not an impediment to action and the UN
even provided the umbrella under which opposing sides-the U.S. and
the Soviet Union-took part.29
In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations appointed by
the UN Secretary-General concluded "the United Nations does not wage
war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been en-
trusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter."3°
This in fact is how the UN was envisaged to work. "Instead of being
a substitute for great powers, [the United Nations] was designed to de-
pend on them."3' This structure was thought to provide the means for the
UN to carry out its decisions. But the structure also created a reliance on
strong military powers to act and an expectation that these powers would
act within the confines of the UN community's interpretation of the
29. An example is the US and USSR troop contributions to the UN Truce Supervision
Organization based on a 1973 joint approach by the two countries to the UN Secretary-
General. See Bakhityar Tuzmukhamedow, Russian Federation: the Pendulum of Powers and
Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 257-58.
30. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All
Their Aspects, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 87, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/55/305,
SC/2000/809 (2000) [hereinafter Comprehensive Review].
31. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Will That Makes It Work, WASH. POST, March 2, 2003,
at B3.
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scope of an authorization. The effort to institute international control or
oversight over use of national military assets has been one of the less
developed parts of the UN security system. At the same time, relying on
one or two large military powers has caused much of the UN member-
ship concern. The views of an Indian UN scholar are perhaps typical:
[Tihere has been a perceptible undercurrent of unease since the
end of the Cold War that the will of the UNSC has been bent too
easily and too often to the wishes of the sole superpower....
Developing countries fear that in some sections of the west to-
day, the view has gained ground that anyone but the legitimate
authorities can use force. If this is then used as an alibi to launch
UN-authorized humanitarian interventions against the wishes of
the legitimate governments of member states, the international
organization would quickly be viewed more as a threat to the se-
curity of many countries than as a source of protection against
major-power predators.32
B. The UN as a Forum for Change
In the conclusion of Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force
in International Law, Harold Jacobson and I wrote that:
[T]he international community has become considerably more
sophisticated about using military forces under international in-
stitutions than it was when Woodrow Wilson and others first
sought to give effect to the doctrine of collective security in the
early years of the twentieth century. Practice has demonstrated
that there is a range of ways in which military forces can be used
under international institutions, from monitoring and observation
through enforcement. The doctrine of collective self-defense was
developed as a supplement to collective security.
In the closing years of the twentieth century, states began to
struggle with the question of using military forces to ensure the
physical safety of populations within states and the protection of
their human rights. In several cases states decided that military
forces could be deployed to pacify intra-state as well as inter-
state conflicts, thus crossing the barrier of territorial sovereignty.
32. Ramesh Thakur & Dipankar Banerjee, India: Democratic, Poor, Internationalist, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 176, 204.
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But this issue is far from settled, and it involves much more than
defining the national interests of democracies.33
But what if international authorization is not available because of the
inability of states to authorize collective action and their unwillingness
to contribute troops to an operation? This was the issue raised in the af-
termath of the Rwanda massacre in 1992 leading UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to ask "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unaccept-
able assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that af-
fect every precept of our common humanity?"34
One answer has come from the International Commission on State
Sovereignty and Intervention. The Commission concluded that states
have a responsibility to protect populations that are being subjected to
mass violations of human rights and genocide. The critical threshold for
action is that such mass violation must be occurring before states can act,
and even then states can intervene only if there is a reasonable chance
that military action can provide relief and protection to the victim popu-
lation.35 The Commission's report states directly that:
The Security Council should take into account in all its delibera-
tions that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in
conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned
states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and ur-
gency of that situation-and that the stature and credibility of
the United Nations may suffer thereby.
36
To the extent that the United Nations depends on its most powerful
members to carry out its decisions and to maintain its effectiveness, a
tension exists between decision-making and capacity to act. For deci-
sion-making, the UN Security Council requires a nine-member (of
fifteen) majority vote consisting of more than just the veto-holding five
permanent members. One of the five can block a decision by casting a
veto, but no decision can be made without nine members supporting
such a decision, the permanent five supporting the majority or abstain-
ing. So although the UN system might not effectively stop the use of
force in all cases, it serves as a forum where powers are expected to pub-
licly defend their decisions to use force and as such, to restrain uses of
33. Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson, Toward a Mixed System of Democratic Ac-
countability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 349, 379.
34. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY [CAN-
ADA], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT vii (2001).
35. Id. at xii (emphasis added).
36. Id. at xiii.
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force. But, as we have also seen, the UN may not be able to restrain
powerful states from using force even if an international consensus au-
thorizing it cannot be achieved. This will particularly be the case if a
state's security appears to be under threat. If the 1990s are remembered
for an effort to provide a basis for international action when groups are
subjected to mass killing and other brutality by their governments, it is
perhaps not a surprise that states now seek to address what are seen as
new threats to their own security. If the current structure of international
institutions does not effectively address these questions, does this neces-
sarily mean the return to a self-judging and unregulated international
security system?
Implicit in that question is the assumption that without international
authorization, state behavior is essentially unregulated. Such a conclu-
sion would overlook the considerable number of national constraints and
safeguards that exist at the state level to protect against the wanton loss
of lives and resources through military operations that do not serve a
state's interests. National safeguards are not a substitute for international
regulation, but when international regulation fails or proves inadequate,
regulation can and does move to the national level. National safeguards
further come in two forms-the formal and the informal. Formal safe-
guards are found in constitutions and national institutions such as
legislatures, courts, and budgets." Informal safeguards operate through
political culture and public opinion." The effectiveness of these safe-
guards varies widely depending on the strength of the domestic political
system, including whether it is democratic and therefore open to public
debate or not.
It may also be useful to recall that even when the international sys-
tem regulating the use of force is functioning and military forces are
used under international auspices, national safeguards and controls over
these forces continue to operate. We have already seen that the closer the
UN approaches war, the more it must rely on member states to carry out
the operations. These military forces remain under national commands
and are principally accountable to national authorities. Indeed, until
1999 and the issuance of the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin on "Ob-
servance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,"'39
37. For examples of constitutional restraints, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Interface of
National Constitutional Systems with International Law and Institutions on Using Military
Forces, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 39.
38. For examples of such political factors, see Karen A. Mingst, Domestic Political
Factors and Decisions to Use Military Forces, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
3, at 61.
39. Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999).
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the UN did not regard those serving in UN peace support operations as
bound by international humanitarian law because it maintained that "the
UN is unsuited for carrying out most of the obligations in the [Geneva]
[C]onventions, because it lacks the administrative organs with which
states are endowed. '0 Soldiers serving in UN operations were assumed
to be bound to international humanitarian law through their national sys-
tems.
National political and legal processes may also take on more promi-
nent roles in cases when international law appears inadequate to address
particular circumstances. When existing international standards and
structures are under stress, national debate and political process may
have to fill the gap and set the criteria for action, as well as the limits for
such operations. We saw an example of this in the debates over humani-
tarian intervention. The relationship of domestic political debate and the
implementation of international obligations is perhaps more frequently
regarded as a barrier to the development of an international security sys-
tem rather than as a force for change. 2 However, as the constituent
elements of international institutions in the area of international security,
states remain the key force both for carrying out the decisions of the in-
stitutions and for initiating change:
The more sophisticated and complicated forms of using military
forces under international auspices require the parallel develop-
ment of domestic acceptance and practice. This process in turn
contributes to shaping both the practice and scope of interna-
tional action.
This process is not new. Such domestic debates have occurred
throughout the development of an international framework for
using force. The failure of the League of Nations to be a suc-
cessful guardian of the peace compelled political leaders in the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other states to
40. Robert C.R. Siekmann, The Legal Responsibility of Military Personnel, in DEMOC-
RATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 104, 109.
41. See Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo, SURVIVAL, Autumn
1999, at 102, 107.
42. See, for example, the views of Senator Jesse Helms as expressed in Senator Jesse
Helms, Address Before the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 29, 2000) available at
http://www.newsmax.com/articles/print.shtml?a=2000/l/28/211810 (last visited Sept. 16,
2003) ("If the United Nations is to survive into the 21st century, it must recognize its limita-
tions. The demands of the United States have not changed much since Henry Cabot Lodge laid
out his conditions for joining the League of Nations 80 years ago: Americans want to ensure
that the United States of America remains the sole judge of its own internal affairs, that the
United Nations is not allowed to restrict the individual rights of U.S. citizens, and that the
United States retains sole authority over the deployment of United States forces around the
world.").
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seek actively through political consensus the acceptance of the
UN Charter's collective security obligations, and later of the
North Atlantic Treaty. Debates about fulfilling Article 43 obliga-
tions, and then the Korean and Gulf Wars, tested and reshaped
this consensus. The deployment of military forces for monitor-
ing and observation and traditional peacekeeping tasks was
broadly accepted during the Cold War. As the UN and NATO
have since undertaken more complex, more risky, and more
costly interventionist operations that do not always have the
consent of the receiving state, the consensus has been tested and
reshaped again.43
Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson concluded in their study of deci-
sion-making, The Anatomy of Influence, that the significance of
international organizations is better judged "according to how far they
involve the effective policy-making processes of governments rather than
how independent of states they have become."44 It is in this relationship
that we might find some ongoing or residual influence of international
institutions even when the mechanisms of international decision-making
are blocked. Cox and Jacobson described this as follows:
International organizations facilitate orderly management of in-
tergovernmental relations without significantly changing the
structure of power that governs these relations, at least in the
short term and somewhat beyond. Over their longer history, the
greatest potential for change from international organizations
may lie in the opportunity they give the less powerful to influ-
ence the climate of opinion and the accepted values according to
which action is determined.45
We find examples of such recognition of international institutional
views in the legislative and policy debates of some of the world's most
important military powers. One example is in the British Parliament's
consideration of the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee took oral and written statements from a wide range of indi-
viduals including government officials, diplomats, academics, and
lawyers and concluded that the NATO intervention was "contrary to the
specific terms of ... the UN Charter," but that this might have been
43. Ku & Jacobson, supra note 33, at 380.
44. ROBERT W. Cox & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECI-
SION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 428 (1973).
45. Id.
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avoided if the Allies had attempted to use the Uniting for Peace proce-
dures of the General Assembly.
'""
Another example of the enduring influence of international institu-
tions is the move towards multilateralism as the basis for foreign policy.
This view has been most publicly advanced by the principal powers of
the European Union, France and Germany. The French view has been
described as stemming from:
its opposition to any kind of domination or hegemony of the
world scene by a single state; France has a preference for multi-
polarity, of which the Security Council is an institutional
component and safeguard. The UNSC remains the only interna-
tional institution able to legitimize the use of force. In the
Kosovo crisis.. .France was keen to find a legal basis for action
by NATO in the previous resolutions of the Security Council,
even if this justification was difficult to sustain. When urgency
prevents such authorization beforehand, France still insists on
having the Security Council ratify a posteriori an intervention.
The continuous efforts made by France to get the UNSC in-
volved in the Kosovo crisis, after the military intervention
started in the spring of 1999, derived directly from this opposi-
tion to ad hoc multipolarity.
41
And even in the United States, poll after poll showed that Americans
prefer that their government work under a UN mandate whenever possi-
ble.4' The United Nations is at the apex of the international political and
legal structure for security. There is no other organization that has
universal membership and a mandate to deal with issues of war and
peace. Nearly all states clearly prefer to have the Security Council's au-
thorization when they use military forces. It bestows a legitimacy that
cannot be gained in any other way. This legitimacy can be crucial on
the international plane, but is also important legally and politically to
decision-making within states.
In practice, when military forces have been used under the auspices
of international institutions-as they were in about half of the interstate
conflicts and a third of the intrastate conflicts that occurred between
46. UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOURTH
REPORT: Kosovo, HC 28-I, (2000), reprinted in 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 877, available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm I 99900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
47. Yves Boyer et al., France: Security Council Legitimacy and Executive Primacy, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 280, 287.
48. CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND
FOREIGN POLICY 30 (2002), available at http://worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport.pdf (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003).
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1945 and 2002-the Security Council has largely performed its intended
role of authorizing their use. The UNSC authorized 76 of the 79 uses of
force considered in this study, or 96% of them. 9 In three of the 79 opera-
tions, two recommendations of the UN General Assembly and one North
Atlantic Council decision provided the basis for the use of military
forces . Whether or not they or any institution other than the Security
Council can legitimately provide such authorization, however, remains
contested by several states, notably France and China.
Generally, UN Security Council decisions authorizing monitoring
and observation missions have not been controversial. The practice be-
came well established in the early years of the UN, and the League of
Nations had undertaken similar tasks. Since such missions have the con-
sent of host states, they remain within the standards of non-interference
provided for in the Charter under Article 2(7). The UN Security Council
authorized all of the 19 monitoring and observation missions between
1945 and 2002, and they were conducted under UN command'
The UNSC authorized 56 of the 59 uses of military forces in the
other four categories. The General Assembly, acting under the Uniting
for Peace resolution, recommended UNEF 1 (1956), a traditional peace-
keeping operation, and the United Nations Security Force (UNSF, 1962)
in West New Guinea (West Irian), a peacekeeping plus state-building
operation. NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized Operation
Allied Force (1999) against Yugoslavia, a force to ensure compliance
operation. Although the Security Council authorized the initial deploy-
ment of UN forces to Korea in 1950, subsequent decisions about the
operation were taken by the General Assembly under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. 2 This was also true in the case of the 1960 UN Opera-
tion in the Congo (ONUC) 3
The legal grounds for the UN Security Council's authorizing mili-
tary action have included Chapter VI of the UN Charter (pacific
settlement of disputes), Chapter VII (threats to the peace), and the neces-
sity of preventing genocide and violations of humanitarian law. Of the 76
49. See DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, app. A, at 384-95.
50. See G.A. Res. 1000, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/3354 (1956) (setting up the first United Nations Emergency Force); G.A. Res. 1752,
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp No. 17, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); Press Release, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo (Jan 30,
1999), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-O12e.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2003).
51. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 21.
52. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Use of Force, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INT'L L., at 1246,
1252 (2000).
53. See UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING 175-99 (3d ed., 1996).
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UNSC resolutions authorizing the use of force, only 31 included a refer-
ence to Chapter VII. All but one of those resolutions were voted for after
1990. The one exception is UNSC Resolution 50 that created the UN
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. Forty-two years
later, in 1990, the Security Council acted to authorize the use of force for
the second time under Chapter VII to remove Iraqi armed forces from
Kuwait. This action marked a dramatic increase in the use of Chapter VII
authorization for uses of force throughout the 1990s.1
4
The 30 references to Chapter VII since 1990 constituted 50% of
the 59 resolutions authorizing the use of force adopted by the
Security Council from 1990-2002. They included one monitoring and
observation mission, one traditional peacekeeping operation, seven
peacekeeping plus operations, 19 compliance actions, and the Gulf War
enforcement action. The Council only authorized two compliance ac-
tions without mentioning Chapter VII, Resolution 688 (1990),
concerning safe havens for Iraqi civilians, and Resolution 743 (1992),
creating UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.5
TABLE 2
MENTION OF CHAPTER VII IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL
AUTHORIZATIONS 1990-2002
Forms of Use of Total Number of Number of Percentage of
Military Forces Authorizations Security Council Authorizations
(1990-2002) Resolutions in that Mentioned
which Chapter Chapter VII
VII was (by form of use
Mentioned of force)
Monitoring and 9 1 11%
Observation
Traditional 2 1 50%
Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping 25 7 28%
plus State Building
Force to Ensure 22 19 86%
Compliance
Enforcement 1 1 100%
Total 59 30 -
54. See Frowein, supra note 20, at 1038-39; Charlotte Ku & Harold Jacobson, Broach-
ing the Issues, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, at 3, 19-25.
55. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688v
(1991); S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
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When Article 39 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty were drafted in the 1940s, threats to peace were generally
conceived as cross border military attacks. The 1950 North Korean at-
tack on South Korea and the 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait involved clear
violations of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The legal bases of the other 77
uses of force were less clear and occasionally contested. Until March
2003, the deployment on humanitarian grounds of troops to intrastate
conflicts without any authorization by the Security Council raised the
most difficult questions, as NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention, Opera-
tion Allied Force, demonstrated. In March 2003, the question became
one of what happens when a powerful state does not feel it can wait for a
threat to materialize before acting.
The Security Council has authorized the use of military forces 30
times based on Chapter VII, but only six of those cases involved a clear
interstate conflict. 6 Although Article 2(7) of the Charter states that the
principle of non-intervention in "matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction" of a state "shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII,"57 humanitarian interventions
challenge a key assumption of international law-that states are sover-
eign within their own territory. If we look at the 30 instances where a
Chapter VII mandate was available, we find that operations requiring the
most deadly force had a high rate of authorization through Chapter
VII-90% in the case of force to ensure compliance and 100% in the
case of enforcement. 8 The murky area appears to be in that of peace-
keeping plus state-building, where the purpose of an operation may not
be clear from the start. This fact underscores the recommendation of the
Secretary-General's Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that mis-
sion leadership be skilled and backed up. This is particularly important
in the sometimes volatile conditions under which these operations func-
tion. The Report noted that: "The Secretariat should routinely provide
the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating
and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever
possible, should formulate such guidance and plans together with the
mission leadership.
59
The controversy surrounding NATO's out of area operations demon-
strates the complexities of the problem of intervening on humanitarian
grounds. The central question is whether NATO can legitimately take
decisions to use military forces in non-Article 5 operations without
56. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 3, app. A, at 396-98.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
58. See id. at 384-95.
59. Comprehensive Review, supra note 30, at 17.
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authorization by the UN Security Council. NATO's deployment of the
Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to
Bosnia in 1995 and 1996, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, were
all taken within a framework provided by Security Council resolutions.
Operation Allied Force, the air war against Yugoslavia, did not have ex-
plicit Security Council authorization. Like the UN's enlargement of the
concept of "threats to the peace" from repelling cross border aggression
to intrastate emergencies, NATO's out of area operations represent a
change from its original mandate of defense of the North Atlantic area.60
France, Germany, and Italy initially maintained that explicit authori-
zation by the UN Security Council would be required for the NAC to
authorize any out of area military operation. Russia, China, India and
other non-NATO countries have maintained this consistently.6 The UK
felt that the circumstances warranted action even if the law was unclear.62
The U.S. assumed adequate authority from UNSC Resolution 1199, in
which the Council, acting under Chapter VII, demanded that all parties
in Kosovo "cease hostilities." The lack of a common legal basis was re-
flected in the range of arguments developed in the cases filed against the
NATO countries in the International Court of Justice by Yugoslavia.63
At its 50th anniversary summit in April 1999, as Operation Allied
Force was underway, NATO adopted the Alliance's Strategic Concept.
The allies agreed to make "full use of every opportunity to help build an
undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe
whole and free."64 This suggested that they might undertake an operation
like Allied Force in the future. By the end of the bombing campaign in
June 1999, however, it was unclear whether NATO could ever again
achieve the political consensus required to repeat such an operation.
In 1999, in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan wrote:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of inter-
national order is the use of force in the absence of a Security
Council mandate, one might say: leave Kosovo aside for a mo-
ment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment that, in
60. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance's Strategic Concept
(Apr. 24, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2003).
61. See Ku & Jacobson, supra note 33, tbl.15.2, at 360.
62. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 106.
63. See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Beig., Yugoslavia v. Can., Yugoslavia v.
Fr., Yugoslavia v. F.R.G., Yugoslavia v. Italy, Yugoslavia v. Neth., Yugoslavia v. Port., Yugosla-
via v. Spain, Yugoslavia v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 124, 259, 363, 422, 481, 542, 656, 761, 826
(June 2).
64. Press Release, supra note 60.
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those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had
been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of
the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed giv-
ing the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly
by while the horror unfolded?
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era
when states and groups of states can take military action outside
the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one
might equally ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created
after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents
for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who
might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances?
6
1
The dilemma the Secretary-General posed is acute. A rigid require-
ment of Security Council authorization for military forces to be used
legitimately could preclude their use when morality and international
law would otherwise seem to require it. On the other hand, authorization
of the use of military forces on an ad hoc basis by bodies other than the
UNSC or action taken by a single state puts at risk the constitutional
structure of the present world order. New claims to legitimate authoriza-
tion have already been made, notably in 2000 by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which adopted a proto-
col explicitly stating that the ECOWAS Council could authorize the use
of military forces even without a Security Council mandate.
66
If the Kosovo question had been brought to a vote in the Security
Council, and China or the Russian Federation had opposed action, the
matter could have been taken up by the General Assembly under the
Uniting for Peace resolution. France, the U.K., and the U.S., however,
did not choose this course. France has always opposed use of the Uniting
for Peace procedures. The U.K. and especially the U.S. were considera-
bly less enthusiastic in 1998 about the General Assembly and its 185
members than they had been in 1950, when it included only 60.
What this history demonstrates is that, when blocked by the Cold
War from playing the primary role it was meant for in the maintenance
of peace and security, the UN Security Council nevertheless played other
important roles in authorizing peacekeeping particularly in areas such as
Africa where neither superpower wished the other to gain influence. Fol-
lowing the Cold War, the Security Council appeared to fulfill its
65. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49, 49.
66. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolu-
tion, Peace-Keeping and Security, reprinted in 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 231 (2000).
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founders' expectations by playing an important role in many of the secu-
rity crises of the 1990s. This ability to use force, however, relied on the
military capacities and will of its most powerful members. This has in
turn created disquiet among the majority of the UN's members, stem-
ming from concern that each of the privileged powers of the Security
Council, the five permanent members, could decide to intervene in the
affairs of UN members on its own judgment, assuming it could convince
the four other members of the Security Council to agree.
This concern over such possible military action based on the judg-
ment of a small, but powerful number of states, compelled the
International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention to insist
on objective evidence of a conscious-shocking situation and the recogni-
tion of a "responsibility to protect" rather than a "right to intervene. 67
The Commission's conceptualization was guided by "a clear indication
that the tools, devices and thinking of international relations need now to
be comprehensively reassessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of
the 21st century.' 68 The Commission's report concluded that any new
approach needed to meet at least four basic objectives:
• To establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for deter-
mining whether, when and how to intervene;
" To establish the legitimacy of military intervention when nec-
essary and after all other approaches have failed;
* To ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried
out only for the purposes proposed, is effective, and is under-
taken with adequate efforts to minimize the human costs and
institutional damage that will result; and
• To help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while
enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace.69
It will take time to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach for in-
ternational humanitarian crises. But this report was able to identify that
the UN through its organs-in this case, the UN Secretary-General, the
Security Council, and the General Assembly°0 -had proven inadequate
67. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, at 11.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Official Records, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.1
(1999); Official Records, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 2d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.2 (1999);
Official Records, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 3d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.3 (1999); Official
Records, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999); Official Re-
cords, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 5th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.5 (1999); Official Records,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 6th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.6 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
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to meet one of its primary objectives-to reduce the toll of war and vio-
lence on individuals.7'
If international law prohibiting genocide and providing for human
rights protection appears to overcome, or even requires overcoming, the
principle of non-intervention, then new standards and procedures are
needed to keep international relations from reverting to the unilateral
great power interventions of the nineteenth century. The debates taking
place within states on their commitment to humanitarian operations may
provide a basis for building an international consensus on the purpose
and scope of these operations.72
C. The War in Iraq and a Future UN Security System
The most recent question to come before the United Nations security
framework however, is how to deal with threats that have the potential of
widespread deadly effects, but that have not yet materialized. This is the
question posed by the 2002 and 2003 debate over whether undertaking
"regime change" in Iraq without specific international authorization can
be legal. In November 2002, the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department
of State, William H. Taft IV, outlined the changing character of self-
defense and the possible need for rethinking the rules governing
self-defense. He noted that the question of when self-defense could be
exercised was not novel and cited President John F. Kennedy's observa-
tion during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962: "We no longer live in a
world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient
challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. 73 But what
constitutes necessity and who can be the judge of this in the absence of a
determination by the UN Security Council? Who is responsible and
GAOR, 54th Sess., 7th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.7 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 9th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/541PV.9 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.10 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 1 1th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV. 11 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 12th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.12 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 13th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.13 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 14th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.14 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 15th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.15 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 16th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.16 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 17th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.17 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 18th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.18 (1999); Official Records, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 19th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.19 (1999).
71. See U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
72. See Damrosch, supra note 37, at 58-60.
73. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State to
Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable, The Legal Basis for Preemption (Nov. 18, 2002), at
http://www.cfr.org/publications.php?id=5250 (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
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accountable for determining the appropriateness of action taken? This is
the crux of the problem related to the legality of the war in Iraq.
The answers to the question of who can determine necessity in the
specific case of Iraq vary. The differences turn on the amount of reliance
placed on UN Security Council resolutions 678 (1991) and 1441 (2002)
that were to regulate Iraq's disarmament program.74 The U.S. Depart-
ment of State's Legal Adviser argued that these resolutions provided
sufficient authority: "Resolution 1441 ... gave Iraq a final opportunity
to comply, but stated specifically that violations of the obligations ...
would constitute a further material breach .... Iraq has clearly commit-
ted such violations, and accordingly, the authority to use force to address
Iraq's material breaches is clear.' 75 At the same time, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, President of The American Society of International Law and
Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
noted that "a large majority of specialists in international law believe
explicit Security Council authorization is required to confer legality on
such a military campaign."76
Among academics who do not share this view are Christopher
Greenwood, who asserts that "limited and proportionate action may be
taken in self-defense if and when an armed attack is reasonably believed
to be imminent.' 77 And Ruth Wedgwood who based her reasoning on
existing UN resolutions on Iraq. She wrote:
The founding legal framework for action against Iraq remains
intact and available to those who are willing to use it. Resolution
687 is the mother of all resolutions, setting out the requirements
for post-Gulf-war Iraq. This 1991 resolution requires, in perpe-
tuity, that Iraq give up its weapons of mass destruction and
permit verification ... Resolution 687 designates Iraq's accep-
tance of this requirement as a continuing condition of the Gulf
war ceasefire. Teeth are also supplied by resolution 678, author-
ising the allies to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to use force in
74. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990),
S.C. Res. 1441,58th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
75. Peter Slevin, U.S. Says War Has Legal Basis, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at A 14.
76. See id. This view is also shared by British law academics who declared, "[b]efore
military action can lawfully be undertaken against Iraq, the Security Council must have indi-
cated its clearly expressed assent." Ulf Bemitz, et al., Letter, War Would Be Illegal, GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 7, 2003, at 29.
77. Joshua Rozenberg, Why the Sword is Mightier than the Law, TELEGRAPH (London),
Mar. 13, 2003, at 24, 24.
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support of all "subsequent relevant resolutions" needed to re-
store regional peace and security."
The key point of contention is whether these resolutions authorized
the use of force in the case of a failure to comply. Those opposing the
war argued first that the resolutions did not authorize the use of force
then further argued that the renewed program of arms inspections had
begun to meet the objective of disarming Iraq. The U.S. and U.K. posi-
tion was that short of immediate and complete disarmament, regime
change was needed in order to ensure stability and peace in the region
and indeed in the world. In his address to the UN General Assembly on
September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush said:
With every step the Iraq regime takes towards gaining and de-
ploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront
that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to
supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of Sep-
tember the 11 th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.7 9
Although relying on UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and
1441 as the bases for action, President Bush also based his action on the
"sovereign authority [of the United States] to use force in assuring its
own national security. '80 This latter point coupled with the present power
of the U.S. military has caused worldwide concern about whether the
U.S. intends to break away from the UN security system that it helped
create after World War II in order to counter "deviant states" that it might
regard as a threat to its own or the world's security.
As John Lewis Gaddis observes, the policy stated in the National
Security Strategy marks a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic thinking
since the end of World War II. He wrote:
It was sufficient, throughout the Cold War, to contain without
seeking to reform authoritarian regimes: we left it to the Soviet
Union to reform itself. The most important conclusion of the
Bush N[ational] S[ecurity] S[trategy] is that this Cold War as-
sumption no longer holds. The intersection of radicalism with
technology the world witnessed on that terrible morning
78. Ruth Wedgwood, Legal Authority Exists for a Strike on Iraq, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at 13.
79. George W. Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 12, 2002), reprinted in Text of President Bush's Address to the U.N., WASH. POST, Sept.
13, 2002, at A31.
80. George W. Bush, President Says Saddam Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours (Mar.
17, 2002), reprinted in Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,'
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at A14.
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[September 11, 2001] means that the persistence of authoritari-
anism anywhere can breed resentments that can provoke
terrorism that can do us grievous harm.'
Or to put it more succinctly, Joseph Nye stated that the reason for
thinking about preventive war is "... . the fear ... that certain deviant
states, such as Iraq and North Korea, might become enablers of ... ter-
rorist groups" seeking now to privatize war.
8 2
But where does all this lead us in the long term? Does it lead to more
wars of the type we now see waged in Iraq? How do we avoid tearing
down the UN system of restraining the use of force that has been in
place since 1945? How have we dealt with circumstances where the UN
Security Council seemed stalled in carrying out its functions? In a con-
troversial opinion essay, Anne-Marie Slaughter argued that: "By giving
up on the Security Council, the Bush administration has started on a
course that could be called 'illegal but legitimate,' a course that could
end up, paradoxically, winning United Nations approval for a military
campaign in Iraq-though only after an invasion."83
The question remains open on what criteria to justify action when
such a situation of imminent danger occurs. In the case of the responsi-
bility to protect, the criterion was that action should be undertaken when
there is a likelihood of meeting the desired objectives of protecting a
victim population. So that the threshold for an exception to existing
practice with regard to the use of force is not easily crossed, the criteria
justifying action need to be set high with as many objectively verifiable
factors as possible. And the response to any exceptional situation should
have a clear and broadly acceptable objective and be exemplary in its
implementation. Possible criteria for judging the kind.of action taken in
Iraq are listed by Joseph Nye:
We also need a careful checklist of criteria to limit the number
of future cases. Iraq meets these criteria. The regime has a his-
tory of aggression that has already been condemned by the
Security Council. It has used weapons of mass destruction. It has
been a state sponsor of terrorism. It lacks a pluralistic political
system that allows internal restraints. A war would meet the
standard of a just cause. Moreover, the military means we would
use can discriminate between combatants and noncombants, and
81. John Lewis Gaddis, A Grand Strategy of Transformation, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov.-
Dec. 2002, at 50, 56.
82. Joseph S. Nye, Before War, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at A27.
83. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2003, at A33.
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there is a reasonable prospect of success. So far, the missing cri-
tenlon is a broad coalition of allies.84
The importance of establishing the proper authority and legality for
actions taken is not just an academic one, but has important policy im-
plications. Establishing authority and legality sets a sufficiently high
threshold to ensure that war is the last resort and that alternative means
of resolving a dispute have been fully explored. In the UN system, the
veto was provided to the permanent members of the Security Council so
that actions would not be taken against the vital interests of those powers
whose cooperation was regarded as essential to any effective operation.
Proper authority provides recognizable and widely accepted operational
structures and frameworks in which to wage the war and to deal with its
aftermath. These include the law of armed conflict and the means to pro-
vide protection and relief for civilian populations and property. Bodies
like the UN Security Council further provide an authoritative forum in
which questions of appropriate conduct can be raised if existing practice
fails to provide adequate guidance. It is therefore important that these
frameworks remain available to those conducting the Iraq war, even if
the war itself may lack direct Security Council authorization.
The world order concerns raised by the U.S.-led action in Iraq cor-
rectly extend beyond the decision to go to war to the potential damage
that this action may have done to the underpinnings of the international
legal system that are the expression of that order. For this reason, what-
ever the disagreement over the war in Iraq, those opposing U.S. actions
in Iraq should also reflect on the long-term implications of working with
the U.S. through multilateral institutions and processes. It will be impor-
tant to distinguish between rejection of a decision and rejection of an
entire framework and institution. Although we have seen the former, we
have not yet arrived at the latter, and should work hard to avoid any
wholesale rejection of the existing framework, since no alternative pres-
ently exists.
Consensus remains that we need multilateral frameworks. We need
them to address the broad range of issues and areas that we know have
transnational implications. And we need them, perhaps even more im-
portantly, for the areas where the international standard is not yet clear.
Even though he has been one of the harshest critics of U.S. policy, the
French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, perhaps said it best
when he noted that: "Legitimacy ... is the key to the effectiveness of
international action. If we want to develop the right answers to the chal-
lenges of the modern world and to take appropriate measures-including
84. Nye, supra note 82. See also Roberts, supra note 41, at 107.
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the use of force-we must do so with the authority of collective deci-
sions."85
The present international task of maintaining a structure within
which parties can disagree is therefore urgent. As with any political con-
test, winners and losers in a situation must maintain sufficient common
purpose and interest to make working together possible in the future.
Power disparities may present a special problem when the disagreement
is with the most powerful member or members of the system. Neverthe-
less, the UN's history during the Cold War demonstrates that this can be
done by bypassing those conflicts and interests that may trigger a veto.
This sidestepping comes at a price of removing some conflicts from the
UN's field of responsibility. But as the end of the Cold War demon-
strated, having the institution available and capable when political
conditions are right for a more active role is also important and should
not be overlooked-not by the U.S. and not by critics of the U.S. And so
while there is a serious disagreement among the most important of UN
members, all have a stake in maintaining a security role for the UN and
they should be careful not to destroy it. Though the present war in Iraq
may pose a serious challenge to the UN system, the system thus far still
remains. Whether that system will be effective in addressing the security
concerns of the future will depend on whether UN members are willing
to work with each other to make it so.
In the long run, UN members will determine whether the UN will
continue to play an important role in international security by how it
deals not only with future security challenges, but also with the after-
math of the present Iraq war. A delicate balance will have to be struck
between the U.S. and its interests and the positions and interests of those
who opposed its actions in Iraq most vocally. This balance may require
assessing the assumptions on which the UN security system was built.
The formulation of a responsibility to protect is an example of how,
within a short period of time, a possible approach to the problem of
armed intervention in cases of gross violations of human rights was de-
veloped. In this case, UN organs led by the Secretary-General identified
and described the problem, domestic political processes provided a sense
of the acceptable range of action, and criteria were drawn up to provide
guidance when situations of humanitarian emergencies occur. That proc-
ess drew on political and legal frameworks that were both inside and
outside the UN system to cover an area where the UN Security Council
had failed to respond.
85. M. Dominique de Villepin, Law, Force and Justice, Speech to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://special.diplomatie.fr/
articlegb240.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
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Questions raised by the war in Iraq will have to undergo a similar
political process that may over time produce new or revised legal stan-
dards. Because of the significance of any such change for the present
world constitutional order, it is important that the political process take
place within the UN framework. To do this, UN members will need to
demonstrate a commitment to understanding the new security environ-
ment and its requirements, even if these concerns may appear for the
moment to be only those of the United States. Members will further need
to make a sincere effort to understand the implications of different ap-
proaches. A failure to do so may well render the UN sidelined in the
international security arena.
II. CONCLUSION: REMEMBERING HAROLD JACOBSON
What U.S. action presently lacks is a broad based collective legiti-
mization by the premier international political institution charged with
maintaining peace and security. By acting without specific international
authorization, the United States has set a higher standard for its prosecu-
tion of the war-in how it wages the war and its objectives, including
how it will go about rebuilding Iraq. President George W. Bush declared
that the U.S. and its coalition were at war with Iraq to free its people
from a dictator. U.S. credibility and long-term influence in the world will
depend on the outcome of its efforts in Iraq to create the force for stabil-
ity and peace in the region that the U.S. President has declared as a war
aim. The test for the U.S. will not only be in winning the war in Iraq, but
also on how it fights and ends this conflict. The test for the UN will be in
how its member states respond to the need for ongoing international
support and assistance to ensure a stable peace in the region. If the UN's
most important members-the permanent members of the UN Security
Council-deny the Security Council an active role, that will only en-
courage the unilateralist actions that the U.S. is being accused of
pursuing now.
The world that George W. Bush is working to make safe for democ-
racy, is a vastly different one from that of Woodrow Wilson's. 6 Today's
world includes the political and legal authority of international institu-
tions. It includes technological means and communications systems that
may seem to overwhelm the average citizen in the U.S. and other
countries with information about the war. Harold Jacobson believed
deeply in the ability of the democratic political process to provide
86. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
(Sept. 17, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
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ordinary citizens the opportunity to debate issues and to make relevant
decisions with regard to the shape and direction of international rela-
tions. He also believed in the power and influence of international
institutions in shaping that debate. He thought the political process of
defending and articulating a position was a beneficial one to developing
fully sound and effective policy. And though his preference for seeking
peaceful solutions would make the present war a troubling one for him,
he would have remained optimistic about the potential of the interna-
tional system to emerge from this present war and challenge to its
existing structures with a system that would more realistically address
the threats and elements of instability.
He believed that disciplined study of issues accompanied by convic-
tion and debate through prescribed political processes would ensure
careful consideration of difficult and complex issues. He believed in the
power of politics because he understood that international relations were
far too complicated and unpredictable to yield effectively to a prescribed
set of rules. At the same time, he also believed in the ability of the inter-
national system to create new structures and centers of political authority
to deal with new conditions and issues. His work demonstrated the pro-
gress that international institutions have made in contributing to the
stable and beneficial international system of the second half of the twen-
tieth century. Although that system may not be able to satisfactorily
address every challenge made to international peace and security, that
does not mean that the entire system of international law and institutions
has lost meaning and relevance. How effective existing laws and institu-
tions will be in addressing the exceptions and changes described in
statements like the U.S. National Security Strategy will be an important
determining factor to their future relevance. And the search for an an-
swer to this question would have been a task of deep interest to Harold
Jacobson.
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When Can Nations Go to War?
Key to Form of Use of Force: M&O: Monitoring and Observation;
Peacekeeping; PK Plus: Peacekeeping plus State-building; Force to En-
sure: Force to Ensure Compliance; Enforcement.
* In announcing the operation, President George H. W. Bush said
that the operation was undertaken under the auspices of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 688. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). Somewhat later the UK Foreign Office stated
that resolution 688 did not specifically mandate Operation Provide Com-
fort. The UK Foreign Office justified the operation under the customary
international law principle of humanitarian intervention. See Christopher
Greenwood, International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo,
Memorandum Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House
of Commons, reprinted in 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 929-30 (2000).
The military forces of thirteen countries, the UNHCR, and several NGOs
participated in Operation Provide Comfort I. Operation Provide Comfort
II was primarily a show of force through air power to deter Iraqi attacks
on the Kurds. The United States conducted over 60 percent of the sorties.
Operation Provide Comfort II had very limited humanitarian aspects.
* 1 UNSC Resolution 221 (April 9, 1966) determined "that the result-
ing situation constitutes a threat to the peace" and was understood to
authorize use of force under Chapter VII even though Chapter VII was
not explicitly mentioned. S.C. Res. 221 (1996), U.N. SCOR, 127th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966). See Sally Morphet, Resolutions and Ve-
toes in the Security Council: Their Relevance and Significance, 16 REV.
INT'L STUD. 341-59 (1990).
**2 UNSC Resolutions 83 and 84 (June 27, 1950) recommended
that member states of the United Nations ". . . furnish such assistance as
may be necessary to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack and
to restore international peace and security to the area.. ." and that mem-
bers providing such assistance ".... make such forces and other
assistance available to a unified command under the United States of
America". S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.474
(1950); S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.474
(1950). United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376 (V) (October
7, 1950) recommended that "[a]ll appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability throughout Korea;" and that "[a]ll constituent acts
be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the
United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and de-
mocratic government in the sovereign State of Korea." G.A. Res. 376
1117Summer 2003]
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(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. 20, 294th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950). Both the two Security Council resolutions and the Gen-
eral Assembly resolution provided bases for enforcement actions. The
purpose of the two Security Council resolutions, however, was merely to
restore the status quo ante bellum. The General Assembly resolution
recommended using military forces to unify the Korean peninsula. On
the same day that the General Assembly resolution passed, United States
forces crossed the 38th parallel. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution, 377
(V), which established procedures for the General Assembly taking ac-
tion when the Security Council because of the lack of unanimity of the
permanent members failed to take action to deal with a threat to peace
was adopted on November 3, 1950, almost a month after the adoption of
resolution 376 (V). G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
20, 302d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
**3 UNSC Resolution 143 (July14, 1960) authorized ONUC to help
the Congolese government restore law and order to oversee the with-
drawal of Belgian Forces. S.C. Res. 143 (1960), U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960). UNSC Resolution 161 (February 21, 1961)
authorized ONUC to use military force to prevent civil war. S.C. Res.
161 (1961), U.N. SCOR, 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961). UNSC
Resolution 169 (November 24, 1960) authorized ONUC to use military
force to remove from the Congo all foreign military personnel and mer-
cenaries not under U.N. command. S.C. Res. 169 (1961), U.N. SCOR,
892d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1960). UNSC Resolution 143 created a
peacekeeping plus state-building mission, Resolutions 161 and 169
added force to ensure compliance with international mandates responsi-
bilities.
**4 UNSC Resolution 743 (February 21, 1992) created
UNPROFOR as a traditional peacekeeping operation. S.C. Res. 743,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
Resolution 743 did not mention Chapter VII. The Security Council sub-
sequently adopted several resolutions that substantially expanded the
size and mission of UNPROFOR. Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992) de-
termined that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina "constitutes a
threat to international peace and security" and ordered economic sanc-
tions against Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/757 (1993). In Resolution 761 (June 29, 1992) the Security
Council authorized the Secretary-General to deploy UNPROFOR "to
ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery
of humanitarian assistance.. ." S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 3087th mtg.,
1118 [Vol. 24:1077
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U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992). Additional tasks for UNPROFOR were
added in numerous resolutions adopted thereafter. Perhaps the resolu-
tions relating to safe areas were the most notable of these. Resolution
819 (April 16, 1993) declared Srebrenica a "safe area" and requested the
Secretary-General to increase the presence of UNPROFOR to protect
Srebrenica. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/819 (1993). Resolution 824 (May 6, 1993) declared that Tuzla,
Zepa, Goradze, and Bihac and their surroundings would also be safe ar-
eas. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993). Resolution 836 (June 4, 1993) extended UNPROFOR's mandate
to enable it "to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-
fire, to promote the withdrawal of military units other than those of the
Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground."
S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993).
It authorized UNPROFOR "to take necessary measures, including the
use of force, in reply to bombardment against the safe areas or to armed
incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian con-
voys." Id.
**5 Although UNSC Resolution 814 creating UNOSOM II placed
the operation in our Force to Ensure Compliance with International
Mandates, the nature of the mission changed considerably when the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 837 on June 6, 1993. S.C. Res. 814,
U.N. SCOR, 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993); S.C. Res. 837,
U.N. SCOR, 3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). Resolution 814
requested the Secretary-General "to direct the Force Commander of
UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion
and maintenance of a security environment throughout Somalia, taking
into account the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expe-
dited basis . . ." S.C. Res. 814, supra. Resolution 837 condemned
"premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to
the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against personnel of the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993). S.C. Res.
837, supra. It then stated that the Secretary-General was "authorized un-
der resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those
responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, in-
cluding against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia,
including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and
detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." Id. Resolution 837 di-
rected UNOSOM II to take action against a specific Somali faction. Id.
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